The Fire Safety Order has failed: Fudged investigations and lessons not learned in 10 years of the landmark legislation

(Photo: Clandon Park fire 2015, Colin Smith under CC2.0)

It is now 10 years since the Penhallow fire, which was described as “the worst British hotel fire for 50 years”.

I think that it’s important to look back at what we’ve learnt from this tragic failure of our fire safety laws.

To add to this we now have the Grenfell Tower Fire, surely the worst UK fire in living memory.

I am also including some of the fire safety failures that I found during my recent undercover inspection of hotels in the South West for the BBC to illustrate the problem.

Penhallow Hotel 2007

One part of this tragic incident – which I wrote about in 2011 if you’re unfamiliar with the details – that has remained with me over this period is this statement given by one of the witnesses at the inquest.

She told the inquest how she saw one of the victims, 80-year old Joan Harper, trapped in her blazing room. She said that firefighters with just one engine and no firefighting ladder were ill-equipped to come to the rescue. Describing the moment firemen did arrive at the scene, she is quoted as saying:

“Everybody was shouting at the fire brigade to save the lady, but they did not take any actions to save her… When I saw their single fire engine with one hosepipe, this just reinforced my despair. They did not have the capability to deal with the fire.”

Tragically, this was not the only fatality as Peter Hughes jumped from a third story window and his 86-year old mother, Monica Hughes, also perished.

At the inquest, many other factors that came to light including a poor fire risk assessment, poor access, lack of water, lack of equipment (high-rise ladder) and the FRS (Fire and Rescue Service) being sent to the wrong address.

“I wish that the old system of fire certification with annual inspection was still in place.” Hotelier interviewed in a recent BBC investigation

Following this incident the FRS went around the country informing interested parties about this fire. When I asked them about failures such as being sent to the wrong address they replied that “they had no knowledge of this” – but these items are clearly in the inquest records, both written and recorded.

Lessons learned?

While obviously I cannot say a lot about this fire, I think it is important to say that, if what has been reported in the media is true, then there are a number of similarities to the Penhallow Hotel fire, particularly in respect of people being trapped in the building and the late arrival of a high rise ladder.

We are always informed following these tragic incidents “that we must learn from these tragic fires so they never happen again”. So what have we learnt in the last 10 years?

Clearly when we find out what happened in the Grenfell Tower fire there does need to be some major changes. Brexit should give us an opportunity to reform fire safety regulations but I wonder if the will and impetus is there to make the radical changes that in my opinion are needed.

Grenfell has also put the approach to investigating serious fires under the spotlight. I have stated many times that we need to establish a more robust, independent and open system that people can trust and respect.

Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005

While fire certificates issued under the Fire Precautions Act had their drawbacks, I think that on balance it was a far better system than fire risk assessments, which in my opinion don’t really work.

There are many reasons for this and one of them is how the legislation is enforced. Figures released to the Guardian under the Freedom of Information Act showed that the number of specialist staff in 26 fire services fell from 924 to 680, a loss of 244 officers, between 2011 and 2017.

Between 2011 and 2016, government funding for fire services was slashed by between 26% and 39%, according to the National Audit Office, resulting in a 17% average real-terms reduction in spending power.

294 people died in fires in England during 2015, a year on year increase of 21%  and the largest rise since figures were first published in 2001-02

Together with cuts to the FRS we have to look at how risk assessments are carried out. With no real standard assessment in place and poorly defined competency levels this was a recipe for failure.

I found these words from a well respected hotelier during the BBC investigation very interesting:

“I wish that the old system of fire certification with annual inspection was still in place. The interesting thing here is that back in the 70s/80s each fire brigade interpreted legislation differently from area to area.

“The problem now is that consultants and operators interpret differently, which of course in turn leads to a plethora of interpretations. In addition, it is hard enough being a good hotelier let alone an expert in health and safety/fire/food safety etc etc as well. However, we do try to comply coupled with contracted professional guidance.”

While the RRO (Fire Safety Order) appears on the surface to offer a better solution to our fire safety needs by placing the onus on the ‘responsible person’, in practice I don’t think that it works for the following reasons:

• Poorly defined standards
• Poorly defined competency levels
• Poor enforcement and training/experience
• Lack of clarity and transparency by enforcing authorities

Fire deaths trend

The latest figures from the Department for Communities and Local Government show that 294 people died in fires in England during 2015, an increase of 21% compared with the 242 deaths recorded in 2014 and the largest increase since figures were first published in 2001-02.

The rise bucks the trend of a falling death toll since a 2003 peak of 469 – and the 80 or so deaths caused by the Grenfell blaze suggest the figure may well rise again in 2017.

There are a number of significant fires that I think highlight why the system doesn’t work and these are just four that highlight the tragic loss of life, our heritage and to fire service personnel.

Clandon Park 2015

I looked at this investigation because I was a National Trust member and would like to have seen what the Trust’s investigation had to say and because I had concerns about the risk assessment report. But even though I registered an official request and complaint, the National Trust has never disclosed what steps they took to protect our heritage – neither did they address my complaint.

While there was no life loss in this fire it shows how difficult it is to get answers to questions raised by the media and public.

Cathedral Green (Royal Clarence Hotel) 2016

This hotel was destroyed by a fire that started in Cathedral Green in Exeter. Again, it raised questions from the media and public – including from myself – that still haven’t been answered.

Lakanal House 2009

Tragically, six people, including three children, died on the 10th and 11th floors. It was reported that “those who died had been told to stay in their homes by 999 operators, who believed fire safety measures would be sufficient to prevent flames and smoke from reaching them”.

Southwark council admitted it failed to address fire risks at Lakanal House in Camberwell, south-east London in the years leading up to the then worst ever tower block fire in the UK.

Atherstone-on-Stour Warehouse 2007

On 2 November 2007 a major fire occurred at a warehouse near the village of Atherstone-on-Stour in Warwickshire. Four firefighters from Warwickshire Fire and Rescue Service were killed while tackling the blaze.

This was the largest loss of life for a fire brigade in the United Kingdom for 35 years.

BBC Inside Out South West investigation

This is the third investigation I have carried out for the BBC and it does not convince me that fire safety is improving – quite the opposite in fact .

The BBC asked me to look at two hotels that had recently appeared on the enforcement register. The first one was so bad that I notified the FRS of my concerns because of a missing fire door at the head of the stairs and a fire exit that would not open.

The second one had done some fire safety improvement work but still had many problems, including combustible rubbish and  compressed gas cylinders stored under an external fire escape, poor fire compartmentation and poorly fitting fire doors.

The third hotel, I could see, had carried out a lot of fire safety work but needed improvement because of poor housekeeping, unprotected escape routes, “wedged open” fire doors and poor electrical installation.

However, the hotel owner was very cooperative and agreed to action the items I had raised.

The fourth hotel was not covered in the TV programme but one that I had stayed in. This was a hotel with a distinguished 150-year history together with many fire safety problems – these were just a few:

 

 

 

 

 

I noted many more problems in a letter to the hotel, to which the FRS and hotel responded indicating that they wanted to resolve the issues.

Clearly, this hotel would have had a fire certificate under the Fire Precautions Act and several fire risk assessments under the RRO – so how did we get to this position?

1. Looking at the hotel and the standard of fire safety I can clearly see what was done to gain a fire certificate under the Fire Precautions Act. This would probably have included bedroom fire doors and separation of the main staircase to allow people to bypass it.
2. It is rather more difficult to establish what has been done under the RRO as the standard does not appear to have changed a great deal. However, there may have been some upgrading of the fire alarm and automatic fire detection – but this is just a guess.
3. Clearly, the biggest problem here is where two fire escapes converge above the portable building and associated ventilation plant below one staircase, as any fire here may render both escape routes useless.

Unfortunately, I find many hotels with similar problems and this is why I feel the RRO is not working.

I wonder if a combination of fire certificates and risk  assessments may provide a better solution

During the course of the BBC investigation I stayed in two hotels and visited two more and all four had problems of varying concern. In one the FRS took seven bedrooms out of use following my report because a fire door had been removed at the head of a staircase and a fire exit would not open. This hotel had recently been the subject of enforcement action.

Where now for fire safety?

The last 10 years have seen some significant failures of UK fire safety standards, both in relation to life and property safety.

It is hoped that the outcome of investigations into the Grenfell tragedy will provide an answer. I think that with Brexit on the horizon, we need to think about how we can overcome these problems with a more open and transparent fire safety regime that people can have confidence in.

Having started my career in the age of fire certificates, I am well aware of the advantages and disadvantages of this form of control. I wonder if a combination of fire certificates and risk  assessments may provide a better solution.

This could take the form of a combined building control and fire certification authority that certifies building structure and approves the occupier’s ‘operational plan’ for its use.

It does appear inconsistent that we can go to a restaurant and find out its ‘hygiene rating’ or buy a car and see its ‘crash rating’, but there’s no equivalent rating system for the buildings we visit or work or sleep in.

It would be nice to get this information via Freedom of Information (FOI) requests, but the FRS are constrained by the Data Protection Act and sometimes claim that they cannot provide such information because it could be used for acts of terrorism.

I recently sought to establish how many fire risk assessments that selected FRS’ had carried out in hotels and how many were found to be unsatisfactory. I was surprised by the range of replies.

While some gave me their figures, one indicated that they did not record such information and another demanded a payment of £450 for access. I thought this was fairly basic information that should be easily available.

Now is the time for the fire safety profession to get behind a scheme that improves fire safety to protect people and our heritage – not just to protect organisations or vested interests.