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Reports of fires in camps housing survivors of the ‘Boxing Day’ Tsunami three years ago prompted the BRE Trust to commission research into the problem. As the research progressed, it became clear that the same issues extended to other refugee camps, as Martin Shipp and Kelvin Annable explain.
It is estimated that over 187,000 people died, 115,000 houses were damaged or destroyed and around 1.7 million people were left homeless after the tsunami struck countries surrounding the Indian Ocean on 26 December 2004. Immediately after the event, the BRE Trust funded a project on the needs of tsunami affected countries(ref 1).
In December 2005, a report made to the Disasters Emergency Committee2 stated that “the real cause for concern is the poor conditions in temporary shelter and the continuation of tented camps. In particular, these camps and shelters are at risk of fire, cyclone and flood”. It was separately reported by the BBC that the shelters provided to tsunami victims had poor fire performance. Further investigation on the web revealed that a number of tsunami camps had suffered major fires, some with loss of life.
Reported causes vary; some appear to be deliberate, some accidental, e.g. due to cooking or paraffin lamps. An initial examination of photographs of such camps suggested that fire spread between shelters should be easily limited by adequate spacing, with 5m or 6m spacing, as is done in the UK to protect mobile homes, for example. However, it was understood that practical, structural, environmental or social reasons might exist to explain why a solution could not, or is not, being adopted.
On becoming aware of these concerns, and as part of its research programme, the BRE Trust commissioned BRE Fire and Security to carry out a scoping study. The objectives of this desk-based review were to seek to identify the scale of the problem, identify key factors (including material performance and social drivers) and, if possible, propose a way forward.
The scoping study methodology involved a literature search and review, web searches, contact with various relief and development agencies and the use of personal contacts. It was hoped that the benefits of this study would lead to improved fire safety in tsunami relief camps and that confidence in the fire safety performance of shelters – provided by UK charities to which the public contribute – could, if necessary, be improved.
Although the project came about as a response to reports of fires in tsunami camps, it quickly became apparent that the fire problem also applied to many other transitional (refugee) camps, and the project was extended to encompass all of these.
Fires
Reports of many major fires in camps were found, some with multiple fatalities, often leaving thousands of people without shelter. The nature of many of the fires (in particular, inside huts as a result of carelessness) means that children are at particular risk. Some fires have been described as spreading rapidly, driven by strong winds.
The consequences of fires in camps may also be exacerbated by a complete lack of water or firefighting capabilities that could reduce fire spread or damage. However, it is not just major fires that appear to be a significant problem; there have been reports of ‘many fires’ occurring annually in one internally displaced people (IDP) relief camp.
It has only been possible to gather a limited amount of information on the actual causes of fires in relief camps. However, open fires, kerosene stoves, and lamps are known fire hazards in many settlements. Other causes include open fires for cooking, candles, smokers’ materials and faulty electrical equipment, as well as arson. Unfortunately, many appear to be due to carelessness.
Other potential causes of fire include wildfire (accidental but also deliberate – e.g. for ground clearance or rubbish disposal), lightning, volcanoes and earthquakes. Further risks include improper storage of fuels such as gasoline or other combustible or flammable materials.
Existing guides
There are a number of guidance documents and standards published by aid agencies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), which give recommendations for the layout of camps. Internationally recognised guidelines for minimum standards in shelters and settlements have been agreed and published by aid agencies and NGOs. These guides and standards offer recommendations on spacing between occupancies and between groups or blocks of occupancies (fire breaks), as well as general fire management advice.
The Sphere project is a multi-agency initiative to set minimum standards for humanitarian responses by the international community and host governments3. Through a rigorous peer review process, an agreement was reached that advocates a minimum distance between structures to be 2.5 times the height. The minimum surface area guideline takes into account the need for firebreaks. The guidelines also call for adequate exits in buildings used for temporary shelter.
There are other guidelines published by OCHA (the UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs) on the use of tents in emergencies4, and by the ShelterCentre5, both of which address fire safety. The Norwegian Refugee Council has done a lot of work on camp management, and also includes fire safety recommendations(ref 6).
Spacings
A number of photographs of relief camps appear to show very little spacing between tents and the potential for rapid fire spread is obvious. One article reviewed states that “the government is under pressure to re-house as many of the displaced people as possible but available land is extremely limited”. Additionally, cultural issues, such as how far people are prepared to walk for water or other services, also come into consideration.
In other locations, however, it appears from photographs that there is no shortage of land, yet still camps are built with tents or shelters extremely close together. This may indicate that there are social or other reasons for the layout.
Although there are various recommendations in the published guides for fire-breaks when designing and implementing a temporary or transitional shelter settlement, evidence shows that these are not followed in all situations. A densely packed settlement of tents or other combustible shelter materials, assembled without fire-breaks, provides a potential fuel source for a fire, and the potential for uncontrolled fire spread and development over sometimes quite large areas. The reasons for such settlement design are not clear.
Other considerations
As with any construction, a number of (often conflicting) influences will need to be considered. The greatest challenge is balancing the various risks, such as the need/cost of shelter against the fire risk/cost of fire protection. Therefore, a holistic approach is required to the problem to minimise the overall risk to the occupants, not just the fire risk. Often. if the focus is on fire alone,the recommendations may have unintended consequences; for example, the cost due to the increased fire performance of tents has resulted in fewer tents being provided, due to finite resources.
Important issues that have been highlighted include:
– Involvement with the local community. It is not possible to just go with fixed models; government guidelines need to be followed wherever possible, but it’s also necessary to take into consideration the local community’s expertise and needs.
– Space is important; often shelter is for large families who need to store belongings and equipment. Differences in the need and size of a family should determine the space.
– It is important to build where people want to live – people have always gravitated towards locations that are best suited for them.
– Transparency is necessary in budgeting, planning, design and community participation at all levels .
– Construction shouldn’t always be contracted out to agents – a serious engagement with the community is necessary.
– Committees should be formed to look into the quality of material used and check other factors, like commercial interests.
– Risks from natural hazards are taken into account.
– Actual or potential threats to the security of the affected people are assessed.
– Land and property ownership issues are established prior to occupation.
It is clear many considerations are necessary in the design of relief camps.
Shelter materials
Evidence from reports of fires suggests that the fire performance of the materials may be of concern in many cases. The following shelter materials have been stated in various reports:
– Fire retardant light roofing materials
– Thatched structures
– Thatch, made fire-resistant by coating with fire retardant material
– Tar sheets
– Rubberised asbestos
– Tepee-style tarpaulins
– Heavy duty tarpaulin
– Cotton canvas tents
– Nylon tents
– Emergency summer tent made from aluminium and flame retardant PVC fabric
– Wooden shacks
– Corrugated metal sheets
– Rough, homemade wooden shack on stilts
– Rough barracks that are a step up from tents
– Galvanised iron frame, brick foundation, plywood walls and zinc aluminium roof (transitional shelter)
– Coconut leaves
OCHA has published a report for the United Nations on the use and logistics of family tents(ref4). This report says that tents are often made of three different fabrics; one for the outer tent and flysheet, one for a lining and one for the valances/mudflaps. Most tents are currently made from cotton canvas, but it is expected by the report’s authors that in the future an increasing number of tents will be made from synthetic materials such as polyester, polyvinyl chloride (PVC) coated polyester, or plastic sheeting. There are many types of plastic sheeting available. If plastic sheeting conforming to United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 1997 specification is used, then it will be made from woven high density polyethylene (HDPE) black fibre fabric laminated on both sides with low density polyethylene (LDPE) coating and reinforced with four bands.
Many shelters are constructed using local materials – if these are ‘natural’ products (grass, wood etc) they will be combustible. In any case, many of the materials used are combustible. There are some materials used that are non-combustible, such as cement, concrete, or sheet steel. However, as well as logistical, supply or transportation issues, there is evidence that these materials are not suitable in some climates (too hot or too cold). Some types of combustible materials could be protected by fire retardant treatments or coatings (paints) but these appear to be seldom used, probably because they are expensive and not always available.
Due to the very large number of different materials used for settlement shelters, a wide range of fire performance of materials can be expected. Poor material performance in fire, with inadequate spacing and prevailing wind conditions are known to have contributed to the uncontrolled spread of fire in some relief camp fire disasters.
Findings
Pictures of various camps have shown that there is often inadequate spacing between tents or shelters to prevent fire from spreading. However, a large number of considerations may have to be taken into account in the design and construction of a relief camp or settlement. These may include practical, social, political, environmental, cultural and financial considerations. Internationally recognised guidelines for minimum standards in shelter, settlement and non-food items have been agreed and are readily available, especially on-line. However, it is evident that these guidelines are often not adhered to – or cannot be adhered to.
Clearly better camp designs with adequate spacings – using existing guides and standards – would reduce the risks of fire spread. But many of the factors which limit the application of these guides and standards are social and/or political and are outside the influence of aid agencies.
Many shelters are made of combustible materials and it is evident that better material fire performance would reduce fire spread. But many shelters are necessarily constructed from local, natural, materials (which are naturally combustible), and fire retardant treatments and coatings are expensive, if available at all. Materials provided by aid agencies vary; some are combustible, others not. Again, cost has to be a constraint; the argument presented is that it is better to provide many combustible shelters than few fire-safe shelters. Similarly there are issues of availability of materials, location and weight.
The aid agencies are aware of the risks; they recommend adequate separation or spacing between dwellings and the provision of guidance in the operation and management of camps, but recognise that in reality control is in the hand of the local authorities. Despite the risks and misery caused – and taking into account all of the needs, all of the constraints, and all of the (other) risks – fire safety cannot be a major priority. It is evident, however, that were it possible to ensure that all shelters provided by aid agencies were non-combustible, or of limited combustibility, then this would go some way towards reducing the risks of fire spread.
Conclusions
It is clear that fire is a problem in tsunami and other transitional camps. There have been a number of incidents involving major or complete losses to camps, and deaths and injuries. Fortunately, to date, there appear to have been few multiple fatality fires in camps.
Victims of a catastrophe such as the tsunami or other event or action leading to their displacement, will have lost most or all of their possessions, livelihood and social group. To then lose everything a second time, due to fire, must create enormous challenges to the individuals as well as to their government, their society, and the world-wide community.
But fire is not necessarily the worst or most important problem facing displaced persons; the need for shelter against the elements, security and health are more immediate and pressing problems and, despite the number of fire incidents, it is not evident that fire safety can justify a higher priority.
Aid agencies are fully aware of the risks from fire. The internationally recognised guides and standards that are freely available offer recommendations on spacing between occupancies and between groups or blocks of occupancies, as well as general fire management advice. These guides and standards set reasonable (if necessarily not fully comprehensive) fire safety criteria, which are not significantly different from those used in the UK for analogous situations, such as camping sites. There is no clear need for improvements in this guidance and there would be little point in being too sophisticated with fire safety guidance, since there are too many other problems that aid agencies, the affected governments, and the displaced persons themselves, must contend with.
However, it appears that these guidelines are often not adhered to; in particular there is often inadequate spacing between tents or shelters (or groups of shelters) to prevent fire from spreading. But the factors which limit the use or proper application of these guides are due to local circumstances; the need for urgency, the availability of land, or financial, political or social factors, and these are outside the influence of aid agencies.
It is evident that, on the basis of our findings in this study, the aid agencies should continue to do their best to:
– ensure that their current guidance and standards are made immediately available to those setting up a refugee or transition camp, and understood by all those in control or affected;
– ensure that affected governments and authorities follow the guidelines and standards, and appreciate their importance;
– provide materials for shelters that have the best possible fire performance within existing constraints of cost, availability and fitness-for-purpose.
Martin Shipp is technical development director, fire safety and Kelvin Annable is a senior fire consultant, both with BRE Fire and Security. This paper is published with the permission of the BRE Trust. Copies of the full report6 may be obtained from the authors.
References
1. BRE Trust project Some needs of tsunami-affected countries during their rehabilitation and reconstruction, BRE report, 25 January 2005.
2. Valid International Independent Evaluation of the Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC) Tsunami Crisis Response reported to the DEC Board.
3. Humanitarian charter and minimum standards in disaster response, The Sphere Project, 2004.
4. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, United Nations Publications, Tents – A guide to the use and logistics of family tents in humanitarian relief OHCA/ESB/2004/19, 2004
5. University of Cambridge shelter project, Oxfam publication, Transitional settlement displaced populations Tom Corsellis and Antonella Vitale, 2005.
6. BRE Trust project Review of fire safety in Tsunami camps, BRE report, 25 April 2007.
CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER
Since this study was completed, reports of fires in refugee and transition camps continue to appear. On 27 February this year a fire swept through Shegerab market, part of a Sudanese refugee camp, and destroyed 75 stores. Efforts by refugees stopped the fire spreading to the residential area. A few days later on 2 March, more than 12,000 people were left homeless after a fire swept through a Bhutanese refugee camp in southeast Nepal. About 1300 of the 1550 huts at the Goldhap refugee camp, located 280 kilometres southeast of the capital Kathmandu, were destroyed. Four people were seriously burned in the fire and scores of others suffered minor injuries. The homes were reportedly made of bamboo.
The BRE TRUST
In 1997 BRE, the Building Research Establishment, ceased to be a Government laboratory and became a private company wholly owned by the Foundation for the Built Environment (the FBE), itself owned by a wide membership of the UK construction industry. In 2002, the FBE became a registered charity, since 2004 known as the BRE Trust. As well as overseeing and maintaining BRE, the role of the BRE Trust is to fund construction-related research and other initiatives for the public good, using the profits from BRE.
Under the guidance of a research committee which includes three Trustees, the BRE Trust commissions research projects from BRE, funds PhD studentships, and supports four University centres of excellence, the first of which was the BRE Centre for Fire Safety Engineering at the University of Edinburgh. The research projects supported by BRE Trust have contributed both to the maintenance and development of the UK’s knowledge base in these subjects and to the education of future practitioners.