Based on thorough research, Button suggests that UK regulation must be more demanding if the performance and accountability of the industry are to be truly enhanced, and if contractors are to play the expanding role in ‘policing’ that many expect.
The provision of security in most industrialised countries has undergone significant changes in the balance of state, commercial and voluntary contributions over the past 20 years. The dominance of neo-liberal thought in policy making has led to the encouragement of individuals and organisations to take greater responsibility for a wider range of activities, including security.
Such policies have led to two strands of opportunities for the private security industry. At one level, there has been the privatisation of state security functions to the private sector. The security of sensitive Government locations, prisoner escort, prisons and custody suites have all been privatised.
At another level, the state has been unable to provide the appropriate levels of security demanded. Consequently, many of those who can afford to do so have purchased additional provision in a number of areas. For example, local authorities have contracted with private security companies to supply patrolling, etc. The proliferation of shopping and leisure facilities located on so-called ‘hybrid space’ has necessitated expanding teams of security officers to police them. The expansion of the night-time economy and growing problems of disorder have also fuelled burgeoning teams of door supervisors.
What’s the upshot of all this? Put simply, the growing range of functions undertaken by the private security industry means that it’s now carrying out almost every function that once was the domain of the police service. Linked to this has been the revelation – in some academic studies, at least – of police-like modes of operation. Private security provision is growing and, in some countries like our own, now employs more operatives than the police.
The perceived purpose of the private security industry also differs across the EU. In Spain, for example, reforms have aimed to create an industry that could be considered an auxiliary to the public police. In some European states, security officers are routinely permitted to carry firearms.
Resistance to regulation
The growth of the private security industry has generally been considered a benign development, with legal controls required to shape the process rather than prevent it. Most European countries introduced regulation in the 1970s and 1980s in response to the changes outlined, combined with concerns over the industry’s performance. In Great Britain, there has been resistance to the introduction of regulatory controls on neo-liberal grounds that private security is no different from any other service industry (such as cleaning or catering).
Overwhelmingly, the evidence suggests that security personnel do undertake special functions, have access to privileged information, exercise powers, use force and conduct many duties comparable to those of the police. It was no surprise to see the Government bow to the inevitable and bring in to law the Private Security Industry Act 2001.
The regulatory system that has emerged in England and Wales could be said to fall far short of initial Security Industry Authority (SIA) chairman Molly Meacher’s ambitions, owing more to the minimalism of the system Stateside. The first concern relates to some of the standards created. If the training of a security officer is considered, the SIA has mandated 30 hours’ training consisting of 22.5 hours of knowledge-based training and 7.5 hours of practical training. Under the old voluntary system, where British Standard BS 7499 was used, the mandatory training set was two days’ knowledge-based and one day of practical learning. Regulation has essentially resulted in one extra day of training on conflict management. Any increase in officers’ mandatory training is to be welcomed, but this still falls well short of Sweden’s 217 hours (encompassing 97 hours of theoretical instruction and 120 hours of practical training).
An illustration of lack of ambition – and perhaps one of the most significant weaknesses – is the Approved Contractor Scheme (ACS). First of all, it’s voluntary. Thus, in the cut-throat market that is security guarding, there is scope for some firms to undercut others.
The second problem focuses on the ambition of the ACS, because it’s largely based on existing British Standards and accreditation through inspectorates approved by the United Kingdom Accreditation Service (including the National Security Inspectorate). Registered firms are entitled to Fast-Track accreditation.
The Regulator had the perfect opportunity to create a far more ambitious set of standards here, but has instead gone for the status quo and standards that will do little to improve the performance of the industry.
Confusion over in-house
The failure to regulate in-house security personnel is another significant omission. This undermines the aim of improving the industry, and will lead to confusion among members of the public and law enforcement agencies.
There is the strong likelihood of in-house and contract security officers working alongside one another in places like shopping malls, with the contracted officers trained, licensed and subject to the governance of the SIA whereas the in-house officers are ‘beyond the scope’ of regulation, meeting only those standards required by their immediate employers.
Another issue relating to the effectiveness of the legislation concerns the emerging mentality of regulation. The SIA has sought regulation to be based upon working collaboratively and in partnership with the industry, clients and the public. This is similar to the ‘responsive’ regulation advocated by Ayres and Braithwaite, characterised by the interplay of self-regulation and state regulation, as well as engagement with the regulated and integration within the regulatory process of their interests and those of other interest groups.
Such a model is clearly preferable to over-zealous state regulation. Nonetheless, there’s a very fine line between responsive regulation and ‘capture’, where the Regulator starts to act in the interests of the regulated rather than the ‘public interest’.
At a general level, the SIA has been criticised by Zedner for becoming the ‘pimp’ of the industry. More specifically, whispers of discontent over its relationship with the British Security Industry Association (BSIA) have begun to emerge. The dissatisfaction has focused upon the Regulator’s apparent reliance on the BSIA as the main stakeholder for consultation. The security industry is split into many factions, and several of them have seemingly felt left out in the cold.
Regulation in Europe… and beyond
As you might expect, in the European Union there is wide variation in the regulatory systems for the private security industry. The least sophisticated is Luxembourg’s, which centres on the requirement for a licence for a security firm from the Ministry of Justice. There’s no licensing of employees, and no minimum training requirements or character standards demanded.
At the other end of the spectrum is the Spanish system, under which both employees and companies are required to possess a licence, and there are standards of character and training for personnel. The training standard for security officers comprises 240 hours’ of theoretical learning and 20 hours’ practical, with refresher training of 75 hours mandated every three years. Training standards also apply equally to managers. In addition, there are standards set on uniforms, weapons, guard dogs and the financial resources of a given contractor.
Rather uniquely, in-house security is prohibited. The law also lays down the activities the private sector contractors must undertake. Such is the ambition of the Spanish regulatory system that it has sought to integrate the private sector into the public justice system as a complementary ‘arm’ of the state’s security infrastructure.
Another country with a demanding regulatory system is Belgium, where the establishment of a private security undertaking requires a licence from the Ministry of the Interior (in consultation with the Ministry of Justice). There are stringent character requirements for owners, managers and general members of staff.
Again, standards are in place for uniforms, weapons and vehicles, and annual reports must be submitted. Basic security officer training stands at 130 hours, the protection of persons 66 hours, the transport of valuables 78 hours, middle managers 40 hours and the top managers 106 hours.
Europe in relation to the UK
Back in 1990, Thomas Berglund – director of Securitas – attempted to produce a ‘League Table’ of the security industry in Europe. His research was based on nine questions covering legislation, wage levels, working hours, second jobs, mandatory training, relations with Trade Unions, Trade Associations and the size of each market in relation to overall GNP.
Berglund’s rationale involved a number of flaws. Some of the underlying data came from sources not necessarily representative of a given country. Furthermore, some of the data was based on subjective assessments with which others might not concur. For these reasons – and others – Berglund’s results must be treated with caution.
The criteria for the ‘League Table’ I have created are different. The focus is purely upon a countries’ regulatory system for general unarmed security officers operating in the static security guarding sector. Here, a more objective analysis may be pursued. As such, my analysis is of the quality of the regulatory system and not the industry. It is also focused on performance issues.
Criteria were influenced by the Joint Opinion of the European Social Partners in the Private Security Industry on Regulation and Licensing, signed by CoESS and EURO-FIET (the predecessor to UNI-Europa) in 1996.
Assessment was based upon whether there was any security-specific licensing in place. If Yes, two points were awarded. If No, zero points. Mandatory training could gain double the points available for the training of officers. One point was awarded for up to 40 hours’ training, two points for 41-80 hours, etc.
The Champions League
In the final League Table, Spain and Belgium were the only two states to score maximum points. Spain just tipped above their counterparts on training standards. The Netherlands was next. Portugal and Sweden finished with ten points apiece. Portugal was let down by a training standard of only 58 hours for security officers. Sweden lost ground due to no regulation of the in-house sector. The analysis did not apply to England and Wales, which has one of the largest industries. Minimal basic training provision, failure to regulate in-house, a voluntary Approved Contractor Scheme and a distinct lack of training and/or competency standards for managers would put us bottom.
The high standards of regulation in most EU countries constitute the Champions League in the international context of regulatory systems. England and Wales could join this ‘League’ relatively easily, without recourse to further primary legislation – by enhancing training standards, making the Approved Contractor Scheme compulsory and regulating in-house teams.
British policy-makers would do well to learn from the experience of the countries at the top of the League Table in regulating and improving the quality of private security.
- Mark Button PhD is associate head (curriculum) and principal lecturer at the Institute of Criminal Justice Studies, University of Portsmouth
- The unabridged version of this article appeared in The European Journal of Criminology, Volume 4(1), 2007
- The analysis of the regulatory systems was based upon three main sources: studies of regulation funded by CoESS and UNI-Europa, and the CoESS Annual Report 2004