

# Cyber Security - Confronting Current & Future Threats The role of skilled professionals in maintaining cyber resilience

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## **Be Very Worried**



40% of companies experienced a data breach

In 50% of breaches, data is stolen in hours

41% of breaches are not discovered for months

61% of espionage is not discovered for months

	nespan of events by of Web App breaches	Seconds	Minutes	Hours	Days	Weeks	Months	Years
	Compromise	19%	42%	12%	23%	0%	• 5%	1%
E	Exfiltration	3%	27%	21%	21%	18%	9%	0%
	Discovery	0%	3%	11%	17%	16%	41%	11%
	Containment	0%	2%	• 5%	42%	22%	29%	0%

34% of companies do not know if/how

51% increase of companies reporting >\$10M loss

38% of companies are not capable of resolving an attack

More than 50% of companies do NOT conduct security testing

## **Common Challenges**





### **How Resilience Fails**





Recognition

Technology

Failure

Complacency

Taking Action

Detection

Human

isk

Inappropriate
Planning

IT

Modes of Failure

Vulnerabilities

Physical

man

Process

Failure

Physical

Dealing with the Unexpected

Management

Failure

reness

Taking Decisions

Interpretation

Inappropriate Response

ights reserved

Characteristics of Failure

Tactical

## Resilience Organisation



Identification



Defence



Response



Recovery

Crisis lanagement Team CISO and Security Leadership

Cyber Defence Operations Centre

Risk Team

Forensic Team

Cyber Incident Response Centre Maintain the ability to resist, react, and manage attacks

Resolve weaknesses in awareness, decision making, communication, and working practices

Remediate problems through technology, processes and people

Develop knowledge, capabilities, understanding, and awareness

Sustain focus and consensus around security priorities

## Why is it so difficult?



### Complexity:

Multiple teams, Complex management & Planning

• Attackers will create and exploit complexity and fault lines

### Integration:

Technologies with Methodologies with Procedures

• Attacker Perspective: The disjoint offers open doors

### **Escalation:**

Scenario understanding, Familiarity, Agility

Attackers will seek to exploit a lack of 'depth'

### Anticipation:

Insight – Foresight - Awareness

• Attackers have the upper-hand and retain the initiative

### Interpretation:


Intelligence, Analysis, Learning, and its Application

North Control (NO September 1988)

Attackers are quicker – and will exploit your 'bias'

## **Assessing Maturity**





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## Why Resilience Fails



Silos

**Outdated Assumptions** 

Converged Threat Awareness

Cultural Myopia

Reactive approach

Leadership Risk-Informed

Competing

**Priorities** 

Risk

**Dealing with Complexity** 

Perspectives on 'Cold War'

**Assessing Probabilities** 

Budgets

**Analytical Bias** 

Information Assurance

**Analytical Failure** 

**Tackling Uncertainty** 

Cost Silver Bullets

**Outdated** methods

**Accepting Mediocrity** 

Misaligned Strategy

Formalised Policy & Planning

Complacency

Ignorance

Vulnerability Scanning

Intelligence Forewarning

**Board-level Consensus** 

Symptoms of Inertia Delusion

Insurance


Compliance

**Ineffective Capability** 

Exercising Your Response – Building Your Resilience

### What Does it Take?





ALL DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPERT

## **Assurance Program Set-up**



### **Monitoring**

- Program Objectives
- Desired End State View
- Embed Evaluative Processes
- Regular Testing
- Assessment Schedule
- Current State of Readiness
- Ongoing Gap Analysis
- Operational Priorities

**Capabilities** 

**Playbook** 

**Policy** 

**Procedures** 

**Skills** 

#### • Investigate:

the degree to which organizational readiness is appropriate, complete and effective.

#### Evaluate:

IR planning, capabilities, and procedures are, and under which conditions they are more likely to fail.

### Practise! Practise! Practise!



- How your security organisation enacts 'playbook' responses to cyber incidents
- 2 How security professionals work with technology, methods, and procedures
- 3 How security leadership adapts plans and responses to unexpected aspects
- 4 How different teams work together on complex challenges

ALTERNATION OF THE PROPERTY.

If you identified a breach could you detect it?

Could you

Could you accurately & quickly assess impact?

Have you prepared for worst case scenario?

The early stages are designed to test the teams' abilities:

- To detect & analyse malware
- To identify loss of command & control
- To assimilate threat intelligence
- To 'triage' technical attacks.

### Subsequent evolutions examine:

- The management of 'triage' under different conditions
- The organisational & procedural aspects of coordinating a multifaceted response.
- The management of 'crises' in the face of a targeted cyber attack

## Targeted by Advanced Attackers



A coordinated attack in an attempt to cripple the client has caused widespread damage.

Sensitive data has been leaked and the client's website has been defaced.

Information about the attack itself leaks and goes viral on social media, with reference to a cyber 9/11, and causes severe reputational consequences.

Growing fears about the state of the client's well-being leads to pressure from the client's customers, and eventually...... the regulator.

This pressure is intensified by continued cyber-attacks that affect customer data.

### **Triage Basics?**



- 1. Who should be part of the response team:
  - Who should call on the response team?
  - Who should manage such an event?
  - Does he know who should be attended in each type of event?
  - Does it work in reality?
  - Clear triggers for initiating a forensic investigation (post-mortem and in-action)?

- 2. Who initiates an in-action forensic investigation?
  - Do they have the proper means?
  - Can the team cover the needed scope?
  - Do they have sufficient training?
  - Do they have sufficient experience and practice?
  - What is the scope of each team? (incident response and forensic team)
- 3. Does the forensic team know what they can get from each of the available security systems at their disposal?
- 4. Is there a documented process for assessing the infected system and its implications?
- 5. How is it determined that a threat has been completely eliminated?

### **Incident Management**



- How well do security principals manage and lead a cyber-attack crisis?
- How well does the security organization responds to a cyber-attack?
- How consistently and how efficient is reporting to upper management?
- Is there a documented and familiar policy regarding when and how to switch between incident response and crisis management?
- Can the immediate threats be detected? Can the risks that stem from them be understood and neutralized?
- Can the participants understand the attacker's intentions and way of thinking in order to proactively neutralize them?

## Managerial Processes & Capabilities



### Situational Awareness

Is this what it seems?

What don't you know?

What could happen next?

Will this follow the pattern of other events?

Does this fit a scenario you have anticipated?

Do you have a plan in place for this scenario?

## Communications & Management

Who is being notified, what is being reported?

Which teams/groups/individuals are involved?

How are they communicating and exchanging information?

Is communication effective, timely, and leading to appropriate actions?

How efficient is communication with external parties?

## **Knowledge and Decision-making**

How have plans survived first contact with the enemy?

Who is taking decisions and based on what?

What is the process of assimilating alerts/indications with situational information?

Is situational information translating into actionable intelligence?

How is the process generating real-time **knowledge** and supporting an agile response?

### **Crisis Management**

Which executives are on the team and how do they support the response team?

Were they familiar with how to enact a response?

How quickly did they become effective?

When should a new risk assessment take place?

Who is assessing the risk throughout the crisis?

At what stage did they get involved?

What are the possible implications from escalation

### The more common problems?



- Lack of Intelligence
- Too many signals or noise
- Early Warning?
- Pinning Hopes on Technology
- Coping with the familiar
- Analytical Bias
- Obsession with 'The Probable'
- Lack of Options

### Concerns

- Skills and Experience
- Lack of 'Maturity'
- Security Testing Only?
- Desk-top 'exercise'
- Proper 'expert' scrutiny?
- Lack of Familiarity!
- Lack of Options!

# Be Prepared



- ✓ uncertainty is the essence of war, surprise its rule
- ✓ Embrace the attackers view
- ✓ Accelerate your Maturity
- ✓ Practice makes Perfect
- ✓ Develop a Preoccupation with Causes of Failure
- ✓ A Commitment to Proactive Defence

