(Image: Smalljim on Wikimedia Commons under CC BY-SA 4.0)
Then in March this year I posed further questions about the Devon & Somerset Fire & Rescue Service (DSFRS) report into the fire.
Unfortunately, few of these questions have been answered and there remain many areas of concern.
These were the key areas that I raised initially:
The report into the fire failed to answer many questions I raised and only gives me more concern about the accuracy of serious fire investigations carried out by an organisation with a vested interest in the outcome. It is not clear there is sufficient transparency to ensure that protect the public interest.
The key unanswered questions:
I have now looked at the Health and Safety Executive’s (HSE) role in assessing the fire and this also raises serious concerns.
This is the HSE timeline of events following a Freedom of Information (FOI) request to the HSE about communication between DSFRS, building control (BC) and English Heritage (EH), both before and after the event.
Parts of the timeline not specifically related to this investigation were omitted.
The DSFRS report into the fire states that in this respect:
“The CDM Regulations are for buildings that are under construction, any responsibility or powers for Fire and Rescue Services to inspect for fire safety regulations adherence in respect of a construction site which is contained within or forms part of premises occupied by persons other than those carrying out construction work, or any activity related to this work is removed. The Regulations inspecting body is the Health & Safety Executive.
“Due to this DSFRS did not have any enforcement or inspection responsibilities of the building works being undertaken in number 18 (origin of fire) prior to the fire occurring.”
As seen in the HSE timeline there does not appear to have been any discussion or agreements in place with DSFRS prior to the fire. While there may not have been any direct involvement there were liaison responsibilities together with observations and comments at the planning stage. Given the historic nature of this area and the RCH, I would have expected this to be given a high priority.
There is reference in the HSE report to welding carried out the previous day and the area where this work was undertaken is shown, although strangely enough there is no reference to this in the DSFRS report.
The HSE report shows that the hot work was completed by 11am and the welder remained on site until 3pm and reported no signs of fire or smoke.
It is also reported that the site manager left the site at 7. 30pm. The report also points out that no issues were identified with the procedures implemented by redacted in relation to hot works undertaken on site on 27 October 2016.
It is interesting to note that the HSE Report has no mention of a fire risk assessment but refers only to a fire plan – in my understanding something entirely different.
The other interesting point is that the report states that “the fire plan document was documented but has not been seen as part of the investigation apart from a photograph of a notice board and a verbal description by the site manager of the arrangements in place – eg number of fire extinguishers, means of raising the alarm in the event of fire, implementing and review of fire exit routes, no smoking on site etc.”
When I asked the HSE for a copy of the fire risk assessment I was directed towards their report that does not specifically refer to a FRA. HSG168 clearly states: “Legislation requires a suitable and sufficient fire risk assessment to be carried out by a responsible person (the employer or persons in control)”.
Why no reference to a fire risk assessment in either report?
So why is there no reference to a fire risk assessment in either report and is the loss of important documentation a valid excuse for not producing it after a fire?
The HSE Report appears to dismiss hot work as a possible cause but my experience and research has shown me that smouldering fires can burn for very long periods and a number of serious fires have occurred many hours after hot work has ceased – so should this possible cause have been so easily dismissed on the statements of persons with a vested interest.
In respect of arson the report states: “Measures for prevention of arson at the site were also considered, the scaffolding was erected to prevent unauthorised access, the windows at the front of the property were boarded over, full security fencing utilising 1800mm high fencing which installed that was properly secure and lockable points of access were provided.
“The lockable entry points were reviewed after redacted left the site and this led to the locks being changed.”
When I asked the HSE what action was taken to protect the escape route along Lamb Alley (the access route between the buildings) they replied “HSE holds no information”. This was the same reply they gave to the following important questions:
Having had the chance to examine both reports from DSFRS and the HSE it is my opinion that many questions still need answering if we are to learn from this tragic fire.
I remain unconvinced that best practice was followed both before and during the fire. I believe this was a major contributory factor in the loss of the Royal Clarence Hotel.
Two anonymous phone calls from persons with a credibly strong insight into what happened have convinced me that much more information has yet to be disclosed
And receipt of two anonymous phone calls after my article and the BBC investigation from persons with a credibly strong insight into what happened during the fire, have convinced me that much more information has yet to be disclosed.
During my investigation into the Penhallow Hotel Fire I was pleased that Cornwall FRS took the time to respond to my findings. They concluded: “It is fair to say that in responding to some of the points raised by Mr Cox we only just scratched the surface.
“There is no doubt that this tragedy has raised a significant number of issues for us as an organisation as well as the wider fire community. As a consequence, we are currently developing a case study which we will be presenting in due course.”
They also added that independent investigation was worthy of debate.
I was also pleased to attend the case study developed. While it did not reflect many aspects I had outlined in the article, at least the importance of the fire was not lost.
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Were you aware that the HSE had visited number 18 only a few days earlier following a call from me regarding unsafe demolition procedures.
No, I wasn’t – are you able to discuss in private?
No, I didn’t know that – could we discuss in private? Thanks
do you have a link to this HSE report please ?? – i’m looking on line but so far can’t find any reference