Whilst the electrical contractor’s report did not recommend any remedial work who in the NT decided not to do anything about it because clearly the contractor was concerned enough to raise the issue and this may have been the reason the fire was able to spread so quickly – so this may have been a very costly omission for a small amount of work.
- Looking at Section 8.2 the approximate time of the fire starting is given as 16.00 hours – so it can be assumed from this figure that apart from the power failure between 16.00 and 16.08 when the fire was discovered not a lot happened as there are no reports of fire or smoke until 16.08 but within the next 9 minutes smoke travelled to the roof space from the basement.
- If this fire was because of an electrical fault it would have been beneficial to see that the NT had fully complied with the current electrical regulations and that there were no outstanding requirements or recommendations that had not been complied with.
I would have thought that in a building like this thermal imaging technology would have been used as this has the ability to detect problems like this.
- One media report states The Trust insists all safety measures had been installed, although the absence of sprinklers will surely have to be explained when the fire report is finally made public. Heritage experts will also be scrutinising the Trust’s fire risk assessment to see if the house’s grade I-listed status had compromised safety recommendations. It would also have been helpful to see the Fire Risk assessment for this building.
- According to another media report the NT also stated when asked if extra defences had been installed in other National Trust properties since the Clandon Park disaster,“All of our properties have regular inspections from their local fire service and from insurers, so our buildings already have the right sort of fire precautions built in, compartmentation or others. But the thing we need to check is that there isn’t more that we can do and that the compartmentation we have is absolutely fire-proof.”
- One important question that needs answering in more detail is How a fire that allegedly started in a cupboard and was discovered by a member of staff, was able to develop at such a rate that 95% of the building was damaged?
- It is also clear from reports in the media that the fire service also had its problems and these are some of the concerns that were highlighted in the media:
- Whilst the first appliance arrived in 8 minutes the second appliance took 21 minutes missing its target by 6 minutes. In practice this meant that there was only one 4-man crew available to tackle the fire for 13 minutes at the most important stage of the fire.
- Comments from firefighters, who toiled unsuccessfully to tackle the fire, paint a picture of frustration and potentially missed opportunities.
- An internal review by Surrey Fire and Rescue Service (SF&RS) following the fire reveals the service took on board many of its frontline firefighters’ concerns about how the operation was handled.
The time it took to summon a crucial pumping system, as well as “unclear” allocation of roles at the scene, are just some of the “areas of learning” identified in a Command Review Corrective Action Plan.
The Cause of the Fire
Whilst the cause of the fire appears to be a strong possibility I have now discussed this with an electrical engineer colleague and we share the following concerns:
- It would be interesting to know when the last inspection of this distribution board was carried out and exactly what was done during the inspection.
- If this distribution board was delivered from the manufacturer with this fault – has the manufacturer confirmed this point and if so, I believe that this information should be made available for the benefit of other interested persons.
- With an installation of this age and of this nature why didn’t the NT use “thermal imaging” to check for these possible problems?
- Was any discolouring of cables observed prior to the fire?
I did ask Eaton the company that acquired MEM about the incident and they replied as follows “Unfortunately, at no point during the creation of this report was Eaton contacted by or asked to be involved by the investigators. As you can appreciate, because we have not been involved in any part of this investigation and are not privy to any of the physical or photographic evidence relating to the creation of the report, we are unable to comment or speculate on the likely cause of the fire as well as any assumptions related to the supply, installation, commissioning and ongoing maintenance of the electrical system in Clandon Park”.
In my experience I believe that where an item of equipment is involved and suspected of causing a fire the manufacturer should always be consulted, as they are likely to be an important link in the investigation. Eaton also went on to state “It is unfortunate that no-one asked us to be involved in the investigation as without access to any of the physical evidence or very precise technical questions, it is impossible to comment when what is presented is the investigator’s opinion and assumption.”
Conclusions
I don’t believe that this report gives us a great deal of information about the wider aspects of the incident and it certainly does not give me any confidence that it reflects exactly what happened. It is important that we learn from incidents like this and I think that as a National Trust member for many years and from someone who has given their time freely to this organization we deserve to see the full picture.
I have also stated in previous investigations that I don’t believe that the authority that has been responsible for giving both good will and statutory advice should be the one to produce such a report, as there is a “vested interest” in the subject, which in my opinion is not likely to produce an open and honest conclusion.
I think that the NT has a duty to make their internal report public so that we are able to establish a clearer picture of all the events that occurred prior to this devastating fire.
If anyone wants to read the report it can be found here https://www.nationaltrust.org.uk/news/clandon-fire-report-published
Most building owners/managers seem to have little appetite to make even basic improvements in fire separation precautions. This is disappointing given the news coverage given to fire events and the huge damage caused to property not to mention risk to life.
Is this because fire protection technology isn’t understood, is the issue one of cost vs risk or is it because since the Fire Safety Order came in that the local fire and rescue services are not as closely engaged as before?
Neil, Thanks for your comments which are both interesting and pertinent and perhaps I can give you my thoughts on the matter. I think that you are right in your first statement that “Most building owners/managers seem to have very little appetite to make even basic improvements in fire separation precautions” and this is clearly down to the fact that it does not appear to be enforced to the same level that it previously was and as you further state “the fire protection technology isn’t understood. I would go a stage further and add that I don’t think the concept… Read more »
Hello Alan, Thanks for the notification of this report. I too am a member of the NT and care passionately about protecting our heritage. Your article is certainly comprehensive and I will set aside some time to have a read through the report. The thing that sprang to my mind immediately was that a fire risk assessment to meet the legal requirements of the FSO 2005 will only assess the life safety risks to relevant people. Although the NT may have had a valid assessment in place I think a detailed property protection fire risk assessment should be standard practice for… Read more »
Hi Richard, Thanks for your comments and like you I am also passionate about protecting our heritage, as I am sure you have noticed. It is a great pity that no one from the NT or the FRS have responded because clearly they have the information that we need and I have now written formally to the Director General requesting a reply. As you state the Fire Risk Assessment (FRA) will normally only address the life safety issues but I would have expected that in a building like this for the life safety issues to go hand in hand with… Read more »
The Trouble with a lot of old buildings and passive fire protection, it is only put in areas of escape routes and not all over the buildings? So it is primarily for the safety of lives and not the safe keeping of the building! We do need someway of brining in a law that states these Historical Buildings need to be fire protected throughout so that the whole building will be safe and left almost intact when a fire starts? protected so that when a fire starts it is limited to its spread by good COMPARTMENTATION. This means that the whole… Read more »
Hello Paula, Thanks for your comments, which are most interesting, and like you in many buildings that I inspect I provide both life safety and building protection advice – especially with buildings like this. Unfortunately, the FRS do not usually go down the same route and I remember a few years ago speaking to a group of FRS Inspecting Officers and telling them that I was always trained to give good will advice along with statutory advice if I observed something that – whilst not required by law could affect the building or the occupants – and so I have… Read more »
Alan. I worked on the steering committee to redraft CIRIA736 which was a result of the pollution caused by the Buncefield oil terminal fire in 2005. The impact of a fire is huge and events like Buncefield could have resulted in many deaths if the timing had been different. The polluted ground water from the fire and subsequent Fire fighting response will impact us for many years. It is worth reading as I’m sure you have the lessons learned part of CIRIA736. The FRA is only as good as the required action, too many businesses choose to cut the cost… Read more »
David, Thank you for raising this issue that as you say is often overlooked when carrying out a Fire Risk Assessment (FRA) It is an interesting issue that you raise as when I trained in the fire service the use of excess water when fighting a fire was regarded as poor firemanship but I am not sure what the teachings are now. Ideally, you should only have put on enough water to extinguish the fire which then turned into steam but of course in practice this was very difficult to achieve. I was recently discussing this issue with one FRS… Read more »
Hi Alan. I would be happy to. It was during the CIRIA736 work that I introduced spill mapping so that I could solve an issue like Buncefield. We take flood technology and work out what happen when we have critical failure. Its a really interesting subject as I haven’t found a site yet that’s EMS works. I actually invented my first product envirovalve to contain drainage runoff, I think the EA and FRS still use this product today, came from my garden shed!! Clearly protecting life is the No1 priority but the impact of a major pollution release could impact 1000s of… Read more »
Alan, The obvious veiled disappointment in the report from the FRS with such lack of specific detail and lines of investigation not fully examined are apparent. With changes to FRS over the last 10 years with the loss of highly experienced personnel has often seen a change of the remaining skill sets within the FRS as a whole, with fire reports often being undertaken with less detail than would of been found in the past. The hidden spread of fire throughout a heritage premises has always been of concern to FRS and subsequent salvage operations expected on the outbreak of… Read more »
Richard, Thanks for your comments – we clearly have similar thoughts on the subject. As you say the report is so disappointing with lack of “specific detail and lines of investigation not fully examined or apparent” and I often wonder if this is intentional or simply the way that these reports are going? When you look at this report there are obviously important things missing that makes it virtually useless for anyone trying to establish what really happened and in my view the report raises more questions than it answers. If you look at the attendance times and query why… Read more »
I have now received a reply from the NT in response to my second enquiry and they have declined to answer the following questions that I sent to them: I have found some plans on the internet and I wonder if you could let me know where the fire compartments were situated together with the lift shaft and electrical cupboard? In respect of the fire spread the SEFIG Report states “It is believed that the rapid fire spread observed at this incident occurred when the fire quickly reached the lift shaft allowing the smoke and fire to rapidly spread to… Read more »
As the National Trust declined to answer some of my questions I served Freedom of Information Requests on both London and Surrey FRS and I have now heard from London FRS who confirm that they have not issued any notices recommending that any action be taken by NT
Would it have been more useful to locate the electrical distribution cupboard in the roof space with the cable feeding it thoroughly encased in a fire resistant duct? That would prevent fire travelling up through a building, This is not the first building to be damaged in this manner.