On May 11, 2004, a massive explosion ripped through the ICL Plastics factory in Glasgow. Nine people were killed, and many more were injured in the collapse of the four-story building. On investigation, it was determined that the blast was caused by LPG that had leaked from an underground metal pipe into the factory’s basement.
The pipe had been installed in the 60s and had been inadequately protected. It was ungalvanized, had no protective covering, and had been backfilled with unsuitable material including a large concrete slab. There was also no sleeve sealing around the pipe where it entered the building. The pipe had corroded over time and developed a large crack. The leaking LPG ran along the line of the pipe and into the basement of the factory.
In August 2007, ICL Plastics Ltd. and ICL Tech Ltd. pleaded guilty to contravening the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 and were each fined GB pound 200,000. Specifically, the charges they pled guilty to were that there had been failures:
HSE inspectors had asked for part of the pipework to be excavated for inspection in 1988, but the request was not acted upon, nor enforced. ICL Plastics explained in its defense that on receipt of a letter from the HSE requiring various actions to improve its LPG installation, it had sought advice from its supplier, Calor. The supplier had suggested that rather than excavate a section of the pipework to determine its condition, it could carry out a pressure test and an inspection of visible parts of the pipe. A letter from the HSE apparently accepted the proposal.
In 2009 there was a public inquiry under the direction of Lord Gill. The subsequent report identified serious weaknesses in the regime for LPG gas safety.
Following the prosecution and inquiry there have been multiple claims for compensation. In a recent case ICL Tech, ICL Plastics, and Stockline Plastics Ltd. sought a contribution from Johnston Oils Ltd. (JO) towards these compensation costs on the basis that JO would have been found liable in damages to the injured parties if they had sued it.
JO had installed a new supply tank in 1998 shortly after it took over the contract to supply LPG to the site. It had carried out leak detection and pressure testing at the time, but had not carried out any further inspections as it was the customers’ responsibility to ensure the safety of its own pipework.
The court found that JO had acted reasonably. It was not under any duty “to inquire about the condition of the customer’s pipework and to give unsolicited advice to the customer to investigate and maintain it.”
It’s clear that organizations that use LPG can’t expect to pass on responsibility for their installation to their suppliers. It’s been found that many of the estimated 40,000 commercial users of LPG don’t understand their responsibilities. In reality they are normally responsible for all of the pipework except for the tank and any pipework leading to the first regulator.
Following the criticism of the Inquiry, the HSE began a survey and inspection programme alongside the UKLPG (the trade association for the LPG industry). As a result, 33,000 surveys have been returned, and risk ratings have been undertaken. Those with buried metallic LPG pipes falling within the “higher risk” category have been asked to replace them with polyethylene by the end of this year. The remainder will need to be replaced by 2015 — though there’s talk that the deadline may be extended due a shortage of capacity within the industry to do the work.
HSE makes it clear that the preferred strategy is for pipework replacement, though an alternative is that duty holders “implement a robust inspection, examination, and maintenance strategy to ensure pipework continuing integrity.”
Want to know more? The HSE has issued a “topic inspection pack” used by its inspectors. Details of the high-level plan for pipework replacement have also been published.
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As with many providers liability stops at the meter, and everything on your side of it is your responsibility. As it is explained in this article ICL was aware of a problem the moment they chose to backfill the area. It may have seemed to have been a less costly alternative at the time but as we can see that was not the case.
Shocking incident, and also a good example of how an incident can cause lasting reputational damage. Every time this story is reported on (with this being 9 years later) people remember.
@RobThis is still new as today as we can not all forget the damage caused. I hope and pray that this is a lesson for all
No kidding. While backfilling isn’t the wrong way to do the job it does seem like there was a failure on both sides to make sure that it was the right long term solution. I wonder if the ICL employee who worked with the utility to seal the pipe even remembered the process or knew that the pipe needed to be monitored. I wonder if the utility was keeping tabs on line pressures in the area if they might have known that something was leaking past that plug.
The ICL Plastics factory had been associated with the injury of several people and death of nine people due to the massive explosion which swept through the four-storey building. Investigation n carried out confirmed that it was due to a leakage from an underground metal pipe which got through into the basement. A lot of repair was made there after to ensure that the factory pipes are in good conditions and that the same accidents are not experienced yet again. Reasonable adjustments have therefore been made for this kind of development which has made a great positive influence to the… Read more »
That’s an interesting point. I think they do monitor general pressures right, but would they have been able to marry the data to that work is the issue. Unless it was all well mapped in a computer system that’s capable of linking the two disparate facts, there’s not much to be done
I don’t know that many computer models need to be involved here, there has to be a way that utility companies know they have a leak other than people calling to report odd smells. I’ve worked inside a large chemical plant and have seen some very old control boards that monitor pressure and utilities do a pretty good job of collecting money from people who use the gas that it delivers via those pipes. It’s hard to say how long the leak was there but I would hope someone at ICL Plastics would have noticed a mell if it was… Read more »
Rob, I could not agree more, as with plastic… some sensors need to be monitored by person… during my training in plastic moulding my teacher use to say – in the old days working with plastic was an art… now got sensors is a must…but operator need to have knowledge how to read them…
this days people have more stress and under stress they could overlook things or just forget to pay attention…
yes,but all of this inspection would be a great before the fact… not after explosion… a lot of the time manf… sectors cares about bottom line forgeting safety…
The stress issue I can understand, I just wonder how many times someone had been near that leak, smelled something funny then kept on moving or what the margin of error is for the amount of gas that leaves the plan vs. the amount they are billing for. I’m sure there’s some wiggle room because meters aren’t perfect but I’d assume they keep track of how much is escaping out into the atmosphere.
yes, you are right but sometimes people do have single line of sight and overlooking problems, disregarding smell and leaks… as human brain tends to get overwelmed with surrounding….