The ‘independent’ review of the Royal Clarence Hotel fire will be nothing of the sort

(Image: The Royal Clarence Hotel in happier times, 2010, before the fire (credit: smalljim under Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 International)

In my previous articles about the fire at the Royal Clarence Hotel fire I raised a number of questions that needed answers and identified a number of shortcomings in the FRS report into the fire.

Unfortunately, none of the questions I raised have been answered and there remain many areas of concern. The BBC Inside Out South West programme broadcast last November did provide more interesting developments that were not covered by the official report. Now we’re informed there is to be a review of the official report following concerns about its independence.

Unfortunately, the review will be carried out by the West Midlands Fire Service and overseen by the National Fire Chiefs Council. In my view and that of many others on social media, this totally fails the independence test.

These were key areas I raised initially:

• What was the cause of the fire?
• Why did the fire spread to the Royal Clarence Hotel?
• What can we learn from this tragic incident?

The first official report into the fire, in my view, does not answer many questions I raised and only gives me more concern about the accuracy of serious fire investigations carried out by an organisation with a vested interest in the outcome. It is also unclear whether there was sufficient transparency to protect the public interest.

The key unanswered questions:

• What actions were taken by DSFRS following the discovery of hidden voids in the Royal Clarence Hotel (RCH) in 2015?
• What actions were taken prior to the fire to prevent fire spread from adjacent buildings to the RCH?
• What recommendations were made at the planning stage to prevent fire spread from No 18?
• Why are different times indicated for when the incident was declared a “major incident” – 05.21 and 05.42?
• Why was it thought that the fire was under control at 06.53?
• What firefighting actions were undertaken between 06.53 and 10.00 approx. for the fire to suddenly spread to the RCH?
• Why was there no reference to the window in Room 402?
• Why is there no reference to the fire Risk Assessments (FRA)for the buildings involved?
• Why was there no reference to the HSE Report or to “hot work” being carried out the day before the fire?
• What have we learnt from this fire?

The official report shows that much of what happened before the fire at 18 Cathedral Yard appears to be directed towards the HSE. The unanswered questions I posed in this article remain unanswered – including:

• Why does the HSE Report indicate that the emergency services were made aware of a smoke/fire detector activating within a business premise on the High Street when this is not referred to in the official DSFRS report?
• Why was there no discussion between DSFRS and the HSE at planning stage?
• Why is there no reference to a Fire Risk Assessment – only a Fire Plan?
• Why was the possible cause of the fire by “hot work” not investigated further?
• Why didn’t the HSE have any information on the following:

• • Information obtained from the previous contractors that were replaced shortly before the fire?
  • Actions that were recommended or required to prevent the fire spread from No 18 to adjoining properties?
  • The Health and Safety File?
  • The Construction Phase Plan?

Note: A few days prior to the fire an ex-senior fire officer was carrying out a fire risk assessment at an adjacent property. When on the roof he observed what he felt was “unsafe demolition” work and recorded this on his phone.

He then sent the video to the HSE, which did not visit the site, issuing only telephone guidance instead. Why no mention of this in the HSE report?

Initial conclusions

Having examined both the DSFRS and HSE reports, I still believe there are many questions that demand answers if we’re to learn from this tragic fire. I remain unconvinced that best practice was followed before, during or after the fire, and believe that this was a major contributory factor in the loss of the Royal Clarence Hotel.

Furthermore, I’ve received several phone calls and other communications since my article and the BBC investigation from persons who appear to have a very good insight into what happened. Their comments have convinced me that much critical information has yet to be been disclosed.

During my investigation I’ve received no communication from DSFRS about my concerns and my Freedom of Information requests (7 Sept 2018) for the following information remain unanswered:

1. The fire ground incident log
2. The fire control incident log (in relation to this incident)
3. Witness statements or notes taken by the officers who compiled the report
4. Relevant information from incident, operations and sector commanders

In my investigation into the Penhallow Hotel Fire I was pleased that Cornwall FRS took the time to respond to my findings and these were their concluding remarks: “It is fair to say that in responding to some of the points raised by Mr Cox we only just scratched the surface. There is no doubt that this tragedy has raised a significant number of issues for us as an organisation as well as the wider fire community.

“As a consequence, we are currently developing a case study which we will be presenting in due course.” They also added that independent investigation was worthy of debate.

I was also pleased to attend the case study that was subsequently developed and while it did not reflect many aspects I had outlined in the article and the presenters were unable to answer a number of my questions, at least the importance of the fire was not lost.

Former DSFRS Sector Commander Dave Jones claimed that evidence he submitted was not included in the report

As I have stated previously, there have also been a number of recent developments that convince me there is still a lot of information not been made available by DSFRS and this is based on the following information:

The BBC Inside Out South West programme broadcast in November 2018 included a statement by DSFRS Sector Commander for the hotel, Dave Jones (now retired), claiming that evidence he submitted was not included in the report.

Jones apparently advised senior officers that crews should be sent back into the hotel at a crucial time, but this was not acted upon, or included in the report. He felt that he “was not being taken seriously”, despite passing on relevant information.

He also stated that: “You don’t start dismantling equipment and sending appliances home until you know the fire is out and unfortunately, they had to cover up failings because the picture was not a good one”.

Evidence was also given by a retired local GP who witnessed the event, saying: “They’ve let this building burn, they are not putting any more water on it.” He subsequently wrote to the Chief Fire Officer about his concerns but didn’t receive a reply. “People who don’t respond either think that you are not significant enough or are covering something up,” he told the BBC.

Evidence was also given by celebrity chef Michael Caines, a former co-owner of the hotel, who said “it was inconceivable that a fire that that was seemingly under control had got out of control”.

Timeline of a tragedy

This was the sequence of events captured by Marc Astley, a local news reporter (photos courtesy of The Exeter Daily):

9:23: It seems to be over

9:35: The drone goes up

9:48am: Some of the equipment is being put away

9:57: The turntable ladder is in use and water is being hosed in to the Clarence

10:01: Despite smoke still coming from the building, the turntable ladder is withdrawn and civilians are allowed close to the building

10:03: Crews walk away from the turntable ladder

10:05: The incident commander seems quite relaxed. It is around this time I overhear the incident commander telling a guest he should be able to return in an hour or so to retrieve his belongings…

10:13: The ladder is up again but not hosing the Clarence

10:16: The ladder is down but smoke starts to billow from the roof

10:23: The ladder goes back up

10:28: Ladder nowhere near blaze

10:35am: Fire taking hold

10:38am: The ladders finally swing into action

10:50am: the fire takes hold almost an hour after the turntable appeared to be stood down

The newly announced review by the West Midlands Fire Service has been referred to by DSFRS as “independent”.

But in my experience, appointing a different FRS does not qualify this as truly independent. Staff frequently move between fire and rescue services, many for promotion, there are many joint initiatives, and the National Fire Chiefs Council (NFCC) provides collective responsibility for professional and technical matters for fire and rescue in the UK.

Moreover, the ‘terms of reference’ – what information is to be made available and who is to be interviewed – have not been seen, so another unknown factor is at play. But a statement from the NFCC indicated: “The review will consider aspects of the response to the incident of 28 October 2016 in relation to the account detailed in the subsequent report, with the findings being provided to DSFRS later in the year.”

“The system of fire and rescue services reviewing each other’s performance […] is not so much marking your own homework as setting your own exam paper.” Theresa May, when Home Secretary

I think Theresa May, then Home Secretary, summarised the situation effectively: “The previous system of fire and rescue services reviewing each other’s performance provided no assurance whatsoever to the public […] It is not so much marking your own homework as setting your own exam paper and resolving that you’ve passed, and it has to change.”

It is hoped that the review of the report to be carried out by the West Midlands Fire and Rescue Service (WMFRS) does at last reveal the answers we require about this tragic loss to our heritage, but I have to add that in my experience, this rarely happens.

In one of my previous investigations the WMFRS failed to answer an important question that I asked following a fatal fire in Sutton Coldfield. Just in case they wish to update their response, I am referring to an article that I wrote in Fire in 1988 that looked at ‘an alternative method of fire investigation following the Falklands Hospital fire’.

One of the questions that I posed about the Hartopp Court Nursing Home fire in 1979 was how the second fire appliance, from a station over five miles away, managed to arrive one minute after the first appliance? I am still waiting for an explanation.

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