While the additional hassle and expense engendered by upgrades and new systems are viewed by many end users as unwanted by-products, it’s comforting to know that alarm companies will be selling systems that bring to an end the worry of being cut off from police response. But is that really the case?
Most alarm users are very much in the dark regarding the potential pitfalls of alarm verification. Why? Many of the alarm companies neglect to tell them that their new, verified ‘anti-false alarm’ system could well represent a waste of money.
Like manned guarding, an alarm system is already a grudge purchase for many. And, if you were in the shoes of your supplier, would you tell a prospective customer that a new, more expensive alarm system which they don’t really want can still leave them wide open to losing police response? I think not.
As many of you will be aware, the ACPO policy represents an attempt to reduce false alarm call-outs for the police. Without doubt it will cut down on some types of false alarm, but unfortunately not all of them.
If one of your ‘passives’ should crash on a Sunday night, for example, subsequent alarm verification will ensure that the police are not called out. Great so far. If, however, Monday night comes around and your security team secures the building while a member of staff is still in the toilet, as soon as he or she emerges you’ll have police swarming all over the place.
In other words, as it stands the ACPO policy does not sufficiently address the ‘user error’ problem simply because it’s very difficult to differentiate between ‘friend or foe’ (ie a member of staff or an unwanted intruder).
End user error: the perennial problem
Readers of Security Management Today will have noticed reports of the DTI paying for the BSIA to study the alarm system verification methods deployed by our European cousins. It will have come as no surprise to our own alarm industry to learn that the biggest cause of false alarms on mainland Europe is exactly the same as in the UK. End user error.
The research also showed that, while those clever Germans still have false alarms, they don’t seem to have as many problems when switching off their systems because (wherever possible) they switch alarms off before they enter the premises – more of which anon.
In the UK, all new alarm systems must now be verified, but be aware that a verified alarm system cannot distinguish between a member of staff walking around your premises or an intruder. Thus, if you manage to wipe out your number of ‘police lives’ as a result of staff mistakes, you’ll still be cut off from police response on site.
In addition, if you have a conventional alarm system and are cut off as a result of user error and/or equipment problems, you must upgrade to a verified alarm system in order to enjoy police response once again.
Managers should be aware that, in upgrading to verified status, they might not address the user error problem. Staff mistakes could soon see you firmly back at Square One.
The Germans and DD243:2002
Early this year, the revised DD243 standard will become mandatory. This new document lays down rules for the installation of verified alarm systems. It’s also expected that ACPO will soon opt for an across-the-board reduction in the number of ‘police lives’ enjoyed by end users (down to three in any 12-month rolling period).
Now brace yourselves for something really worrying. ACPO, you see, is really impressed with the Germans. In Germany, a large number of commercial premises boast large, thick wooden doors fitted with a device called a Blockschloss. Blockschloss is an electrically-contacted lock which, on turning the key, unlocks the door and un-sets the alarm system.
On the face of it this seems like a great way of reducing false alarms on entering the premises, but like many seemingly fabulous ideas it’s not quite that simple.
ACPO now wishes to adopt a similar system here in the UK. From an installation point of view, several things are in store. If the entry doors to your company’s premises are wooden, then a verified system will require a minimum of a contacted mortise lock to be fitted (eg the Chubb 3G110). The lock must be designed to turn off the whole of the alarm system, or at the very least its verification element (remember that the police will not attend a non-verified alarm activation).
Locking on to DD243:2002
The consequences of the DD243:2002 document will be quite daunting for many end users. Fitting a mortise lock to a wooden door is not really a major problem, although if your facilities manager decides to retrofit with the architectural, double-glazed variety then you have a heap of problems on your hands.
Many years ago the industry dumped the fitting of mortise locks in favour of timed entry doors with which we are now all familiar. Why? The sheer hassle of having to fit a lock to every entry route, and the increasing preference for more and more non-wooden doors and entranceways.
Imagine also that your company has several alarm entry routes (of course, in the corporate sector that will very often be the case), and that owing to three staff mistakes during the year your alarm system no longer enjoys police response. To regain that response, you now have to fit an access control system to each entry door, and ensure that said systems simultaneously turn off the alarms. The expense, upheaval and subsequent inconvenience will be a nightmare.
Every alarm access door will need some form of override in the event of malfunction.
I wonder how many members of staff will be tempted to use the override facility should they forget their code number or tag/card, and thereby almost certainly generate a false alarm?
ACPO’s alarm verification and access control solution will not eliminate the problem of staff being accidentally locked in the building, nor entering the premises through a ‘non-intended entry’ perimeter door. Indeed it’s quite possible that, after having invested in a verified alarm and access control system, end users could still find themselves out in the cold.
