As the debate on licensing of the private security industry develops, confusion and concerns from within the industry do not appear to be approaching ebb. Over the last year, I’ve been involved in numerous discussions surrounding the issue of staff vetting against BS 7858, and how it may become unnecessary or even obsolete under the Private Security Industry Act. Having worked extensively within the recruitment department of a manned security company, I’m amazed that any of my industry peers would even contemplate the abandonment of a British Standard that has served us so well.
Many critics of the industry seem to have taken the introduction of statutory licensing as an indication that self-regulation was a failure. I believe the exact opposite to be closer to the truth. Some practitioners seem to feel that the issuing of a licence will supersede the need to closely vet potential employees, but ask any industry recruitment professional and they’ll say that there’s a good deal more to vetting than checking to see if someone has a criminal record.
The majority of major security incidents are either a direct result of – or indeed aided by – basic procedural mistakes. It follows that thorough staff selection, training and vetting procedures must always be at the forefront of any company’s organisational procedures.
Recent events – including the terrorist attacks in America, several aviation security breaches and the Cash-in-Transit robbery at Heathrow Airport – have thrown the spotlight on the need for high standards in security, but more importantly the need to go back to basics.
The cost of inadequate vetting
At the present time, companies in the security industry are finding out all-too-late that a high percentage of new security officers employed turn out to be emotionally unstable, a chronic absentee, a drug and/or alcohol abuser, an associate of known criminals or have extreme political or religious views.
The production of counterfeit documentation is also more common than many people realise. Indeed, over the past decade or more SITO personnel have been privy to numerous examples of fake training and qualification certificates. Many of them extremely basic, but many more of the highly sophisticated variety.
How many of these problems will actually be identified by the Criminal Records Bureau? It’s entirely feasible that a security officer ‘boasting’ a combination of the undesirable traits listed could be issued with a licence to work. If vetting is not undertaken, we might all become the victims – yet again – of a major disaster caused by a minor procedural breach.
Under the chairmanship of Securicor’s Derek Smith – my fellow GW3 Committee Member – no less than 13 industry professionals are now working on the revisions to BS 7858. The aim is to update the standard in line with the latest employment legislation, industry trends and new technologies. Lively debate has taken place regarding the five-year pre-employment screening period, telephone vetting and the use of e-mailed references. It’s envisaged that the draft version for public comment will be available towards the fourth quarter of 2002.
Admittedly, the current British Standard – BS 7858: 1996 ‘Code of Practice for the Security Screening of Personnel Employed in a Security Environment’ – has not worked across the entire industry, mainly because unscrupulous organisations have not adhered to its remit.
Indeed, the only negative aspect of British Standards is that they can only recommend as opposed to legislatively stipulate.
At this moment in time it’s not clear whether British Standards will become part of regulation under the Security Industry Authority (SIA), but the Private Security Industry Act does make provision for this to happen. The SIA has a mandate “to set and approve standards of conduct, training and levels of supervision for adoption by (i) those who carry on businesses providing security industry services involving the activities of security operatives and (ii) those who are employed for the purposes of such businesses”. One would hope, therefore, that the wheels in existence will not need to be re-invented to fit the new regulatory vehicle.
Employee and business development
A further dilemma is caused by companies who comply with the standard because they must, as opposed to using the vetting process as a positive tool for employee and business development. Vetting should be seen as a continuous process beginning with initial screening, then application. It should then continue after the application has been accepted in principle, and be followed-on until completion in compliance with BS 7858.
Re-vetting should also be considered at regular intervals, particularly in relation to a transfer, promotion or if there is a reason for the employee to be under suspicion.
If we consider the initial screening requirement, the construction of a properly-worded advertisement will in itself act as a method of filtering out inappropriate candidates. The initial telephone contact with a possible applicant is also important, and careful questioning at this stage will eliminate many more unsuitable candidates.
The formal interview should also be used to its full advantage, and experienced recruiters will often develop hunches about applicants that can be further investigated.
It’s not all doom and gloom, though. The guarding sector employs tens of thousands of reliable, honest, hardworking and dedicated professionals – it’s this fact alone that makes it even more important for professional companies to comply with British Standards and weed out the unreliable, disloyal and dangerous without adversely affecting the innocent.
Let’s be clear that no aspect of security work is more important than that of ensuring the invulnerability of our personnel.
