There’s no doubting that the death of Osama Bin Laden represents closure of the first chapter of the story in the battle against Al-Qaeda. However, ultimately his supporters will regroup and react to his cult of martyrdom and open the next chapter of the story.
There’s also no doubt that, with the death of Al-Qaeda’s figurehead, an element of that organisation’s potency and influence will be lost.
During the past 15 years, Osama Bin Laden was the key persona, spokesman and visual embodiment of Al-Qaeda. Through his messages on television and the Internet, he expounded the ideology that was developed by himself and Ayman al-Zawahiri promoting the global jihad.
A vital element of this ideology was to move Al-Qaeda from being a physical group of individuals geographically constrained into an evolving ideology which could inspire others to take up arms against ‘the West’ and strike out globally.
Bin Laden realised that this shift towards becoming a ‘movement’ was the key to the success of Al-Qaeda’s long-term goals.
Reflecting on the Al-Qaeda ‘core’
Prior to the 9/11 attacks in America, the ‘Al-Qaeda core’ was pivotal to the strength of the organisation: around a dozen or so members of the inner circle surrounded by around 100 extremely motivated loyalists drawn from the Muslim world.
Below Bin Laden was his deputy, Abu Ayoub al-Iraqi – otherwise known as Mamdouth Salim – and underneath him was the consultative committee drawn from Mujahedeen who fought in the Soviet-Afghan war in the 1970s-1980s and who had sworn a pledge of allegiance to Bin Laden in 1989.
Following on from their forced withdrawal from Afghanistan, the core leadership hid itself away within the tribal regions of Waziristan, scattered over both the Pakistani and Afghani sides of the border.
Due to the ferocious nature of the Allied Forces’ pursuit, the core of Al-Qaeda became increasingly small in numbers and yet retained an incredibly tight-knit structure.
Despite the denial of territorial space for Al-Qaeda by dint of increased NATO operations in Afghanistan since 2005, the small number of operatives had been strengthened somewhat by the relationships formed with Pashtun extremists and separatist groups that live in the border regions.
Thousands of Arab jihadis had made their homes in this region, with many marrying the Pashtun widows of Taliban fighters (which ensures their continued protection and the loyalty of the local tribes).
This is where it was assumed, for many years, that Bin Laden was hiding, so it came as something of a surprise to many that he was discovered in a secure house less than a mile from Pakistan’s main military academy in Abbottabad.
That in itself raises a serious question mark over the potential involvement of the Pakistani military and intelligence services in Bin Laden’s hideout.
Influence of the ISI
Even though Zardari’s administration had ramped up their efforts to counter the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, the influence of the Pakistani intelligence services – the ISI – is still undeniably strong.
Within the ISI there remains a reticence from some members to fight what they see as fellow Muslims.
The ISI has traditionally been blamed for a great deal of support for violent Islamic groups in its fractious relationship with India…
“The ISI’s sphere of influence extends beyond its national borders: militant groups seeking to undermine the administration in Kashmir were reputedly established by the ISI and trained by the Pakistani Army, and Islamist groups within India are actively encouraged by the organisation. Much of the region’s chaos can be blamed on the ISI’s meddling and manipulation, but it is too late to put the genie back in the bottle.”1
However, this raises even more serious questions about the extent to which ISI members were involved in the hiding of Bin Laden. The repercussions of any evidence found to further support this line will be highly damaging for Pakistan.
That the US operation to kill Bin Laden involved no Pakistan forces, and the Pakistani Government had not been informed about the attack, would indicate that their involvement was a risk not worth taking (despite the serious implications this could have had if the operation had failed).
Changing shape of Al-Qaeda
Throughout the 2000s, Al-Qaeda’s global presence and impact dramatically widened as the organisation transformed into a network of loosely affiliated franchises operating more or less independently of a leadership on the run.
Al-Qaeda’s ideology, long-term strategy, training materials and justification of jihad are freely available on the Internet, enabling any independent cell or group to operate within its framework.
There’s no longer as much of a reliance on a centralised base, which was enjoyed in Afghanistan, and few of the terrorists have any form of personal contact with the inner core of leaders.
Bin Laden’s final resting spot exemplified the difficulty he was having in providing the messages to those he wished to influence. The building was cut off from modern communications technology. There were no telephones and no Internet connection, the only communication being his small number of messengers who would carry messages to the outside world.
This ended up being his downfall, as intelligence agencies had managed to infiltrate the network of messengers and extract enough information to form a picture upon which to act.
Diminishing influence on Al-Qaeda’s operations
Over the past three years, we have seen the diminishing influence that he has had on Al-Qaeda’s operations, but the ‘movement’ which he inspired has spread to new centres of focus, sprouting new franchises in North Africa and the Arabian Peninsular.
Most prominent has been the Yemen where the growing influence of the charismatic preacher Anwar al-Awlaki and Al-Qaeda has caused growing concern to international Governments.
Recent attacks from 2009 onwards in the UK, Europe and the US have all demonstrated the influence that al-Awlaki and his group now have on taking the global jihad into the 2010s, more so than the Al-Qaeda ‘core’.
The long-term aims of Al-Qaeda remain despite Bin Laden’s demise, and his influence as a martyr will continue to grow in the months and years to come – as will the glorification of his death being leaped upon by both sides.
There’s no doubting that the death of Bin Laden will slow the momentum of the Al-Qaeda organisation. This is something that should be greeted happily as a partial victory in the ongoing struggle against international terrorism.
However, the ideological message and influence of Bin Laden has clearly been globally dispersed.
The weeks and months ahead will demonstrate how the various factions and offshoots of Al-Qaeda will regroup and, ultimately, react to the death of Bin Laden. In turn, the next chapter of the story will open.
Reference
1AB Atwan (2009), ‘Al-Qaeda and the Taliban: Dangerous Alliances in Afghanistan and Pakistan’, pp 125-148 in AP Schmid and GF Hindle, ‘After the War on Terror: Regional and Multilateral Perspectives on Counter-Terrorism Strategy (London: RUSI Books, 2009)
Tobias Feakin is the director of national security and resilience at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) for Defence and Security Studies
Within this role he’s responsible for the growth of a research team examining issues pertaining to radicalisation, terrorism, counter-terrorist policy and technologies, resilience, Critical National Infrastructure and the security impacts of climate change.
Tobias completed his PhD in International Security and Politics at the University of Bradford in 2005 with a thesis entitled: ‘Non-Lethal Weapons: Technology for Lowering Casualties’.
Since that time, he has worked as a Research Fellow for the Landau Network, Centro-Volta in Italy and the Home Office, arriving at RUSI in 2006.
He has lectured at the University of Cambridge, the University of Bradford, the Joint Services Command and Staff College and the NATO Defence College in Rome, as well as speaking internationally at numerous conferences and roundtable discussions.
Tobias has appeared on the BBC, Channel 4, NBC, Al-Jazeera and Sky News, and is often quoted in many newspapers around the globe.
This article first appeared on the RUSI website (www.rusi.org) and is reproduced on I4S with the permission of the author
